Friday, August 28, 2015

Polish intelligence services pretend to be stupid

On July 22, 2011 Anders Breivik detonated a self-made bomb in the center of Oslo, then drove out of town, took a ferry to Utoya island, where he killed several dozen young people participating in cultural and political activities.

Soon it became known that Breivik bought 150 kg of powder aluminum and several hundred grams of sodium nitrate from a one-person company located in Wrocław, Poland.

He bought fuse from another one-person company located in Poznań, or near Poznań in Poland. Visco fuse, as they wrote in a newspaper.

The Polish security agency, Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Agency), paid the fuse seller a visit after receiving information from the Norwegian police several days after the massacre. The sale of fuse and chemical compounds which may be used to manufacture explosive material did not require any special license in Poland. Both ABW and media presented the two Polish suppliers of Breivik as ordinary salesmen catering to hobbyists interested in fireworks.

The British media, e.g. the Sky tv network, reported that after his Polish transactions Breivik was placed on a watch list of British intelligence service. If British intelligence knew about Breivik's purchases in Poland, it is pretty obvious that also the Polish intelligence must have known about it. It is highly probable that both Polish suppliers of Breivik were in close contact with the Polish intelligence. The lack of official controls over the trade in pyrotechnic materials in Poland was not accidental. Some participants of an English language pyrotechnics discussion group pointed out that the website of the firm from Wrocław looked like a "sting operation" under the supervision of intelligence services.

Taking into account the Polish realities, nuisances and barriers often faced by small businesses in Poland, and often plain harrassment by authorities of various kind, I do not think these one-person businesses were independent.

Participants of a pyrotechnics hobbyists discussion group at one of Internet sites warned each other of likely sting operation:

Polish intelligence services did not inform the Norwegian police about Breivik's activities.

ABW put on a mask of a naive and disoriented organization, who do not see anything wrong in selling pyrotechnic materials by individuals over the Internet. In reality ABW and people around it must have known that Breivik had bad intentions. ABW (or another of the agencies) created the environment enabling an easy purchase of explosive material by individuals residing in West Europe and decided not to warn the Norwegian police or intelligence service about Breivik.

Intelligence services in Poland are supervised by the prime minister. Donald Tusk was prime minister of Poland at the time of the Breivik attack in 2011. He is now the president of the European Council. Can he be trusted? Absolutely not. One of the tasks of the Council is setting the EU's common foreign and security policy.